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This research examines the status of the United States 
(U.S.) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program within the 
context of the current ever-changing domestic and global 
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information gathered from the literature review; the 
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environment that shape the National Security Strategy 
(NSS)).  The study concludes that the U.S FMS program has 
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 This project examines the status of the United States 
(U.S.) Foreign Military Sales (FMS) within the context of 
the current, ever-changing domestic and global security 
environment.   During the Cold War, the United States 
managed to gather influence through various policies of 
engagement and disengagement and through this influence has 
established relationships with countries around the globe.  
 The United States has made friends with most of 
Western Europe and the Third World.  After the end of the 
Cold War, the United States achieved the status of sole 
super power in the world. As such it now has more influence 
on the friends that it has made during and after the Cold 
War.  
 Most of those friends and alliances do not possess 
the economic and technological ability to establish their 
own defense industry and as such defer to the United States 
and other weapon producing countries for arms supplies.  
These countries have been strengthened through the Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) program, a U.S. program that 
allows selected countries to procure U.S. defense articles 
and products under grant or lease contracts as a part of 
U.S foreign policy.  The demand for new weapons has been 
increasing due to the evolution of technology, but the 
United States Foreign Military Sales program has not been 
evolving at the same pace as the evolution of technology.  
 
 





 At present, the United States has built a strong 
relationship with most of the world due to economic, 
political and strategic interests.  Most of these friends 
and allied countries have become users of the United 
States' weapon systems, which have positioned the United 
States as the leader of global arms exports.  The downfall 
of the Soviet Union in 1989 created 15 independent states 
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan) and the 
Eastern European alliance of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungarian, 
German Democratic Republic, Polish, Rumanian, 
Czechoslovakia (which broke down into two independent 
states in 1993, Slovakia and the Czech Republic), 
Yugoslavia (which broke into five independent states 
between  1991 – 1992; Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Slovenia). 
 As more countries gained independence, the demand for 
weapons for their national security increased dramatically.  
With this demand for weapons, the arms export business has 
become more attractive, which, in turn, has drawn new 
entries to the industry. The Third World countries have 
become an attractive market.  Due to the evolution in 
technology, countries began changing weapon systems to keep 
abreast.  This strong global competition affects the United 
States arms industry and technology market.  
 The United States arms industry has always been the 
most sophisticated and technologically evolved industry 
with very competitive pricing in relation to the high 
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technology and quality.  The United States Government must 
provide the right atmosphere for the Defense Industry to 
keep this trend going.  
 The United States policy objectives are to maintain 
long-term military technological superiority and lower cost 
in its defense industry.   The importance of attaining 
these objectives through Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
cannot be overstated.  The Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program is one factor that could support the U.S. defense 
industry in achieving these objectives by reconsidering its 
procedures and decision-making practices. 
 
C. PROJECT OBJECTIVES 
 
 The objective of this project is to determine the 
current status of U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) within 
the context of the current, ever-changing domestic and 
global security environment.   It discusses and illustrates 
the mechanisms, processes and procedures of these programs 
and those relating to them, so that we can analyze their 
strengths and weaknesses in three areas in detail.    
• First, we discuss the effect of the domestic 
bureaucratic arrangement involving the Department 
of Defense (DoD), local contractors, the 
Administration and Congress on Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS).  
• Second, we identify the impact of the global arms 
competition on the U.S. Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) program.   
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• Lastly, we identify the effect of the changes in 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the results 
of successful Foreign Military Sales (FMS).  
  
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 1. Primary Question 
 What is the current status of the United States 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program?  
 2. Secondary Questions 
• What are the purposes of Foreign Military 
Sales and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
programs and were they achieved? 
• What are the policies governing Foreign 
Military Sales and Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) and what would be the 
effects of changing these policies? 
• What would be the impact of changing the 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) budget on 
the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program?  
 
E.  METHODOLOGY 
 
 We conducted a literature search on Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and 
collected data pertaining to the financial requirements, 
benefits to the United States, and disadvantages to the 
United States due to weaknesses and loss of customers.  We 
used business analysis tools and models to study the 
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situation and then recommended measures to be taken to 
enhance the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.  
 
F.  PROJECT OUTLINE 
 
 Chapter II follows this introduction and establishes 
the background of the United States arms export program 
illustrated by the Foreign Military Sales Program Overview.  
This chapter introduces the procedures, policies, 
mechanisms and the evolution of Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF).  It also 
identifies the key participants, mainly the stakeholders 
and decision-makers who are central to the successful 
completion of any Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF) programs. 
 Chapter III analyzes the effects of the United States 
politics on its economy in the realm of Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS).  It touches on the influence of the United 
States Foreign Policy/National Security Strategy on the 
Global Arms Competition.  It also discusses, in general, 
the impact of the change in the security environment (e.g. 
the Cold War, the Iraq Wars, the September 11th incidents, 
etc.) on the arms export program and on the growth of the 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) budget and its future 
trends prediction.  The lack of precise annual sales data 
on Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) restricted our analysis of 
overall U.S arms exports.  The available data in general 
were different between agencies and at times within the 
same agency.  Only those from the most trusted sources were 
used in our analysis. 
 
 6 
 Chapter IV analyzes the current status of the United 
States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.  It was 
conducted using the business model Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) on prominent factors that 
were identified in the findings. 
 Chapter V discusses the conclusions that can be made 
based on the analysis and provides recommendations for 
future policies on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign 


















II. UNITED STATES FOREIGN MILITARY SALES PROGRAM 
OVERVIEW 
 
 Since WWII, security assistance patterns have 
reflected the shape and character of power relations among 
nations and states.   
The United States has always maintained non-
entanglement and non-commitment policies. However, its 
allies wanted to get the fullest United States commitment 
in the war. To demonstrate its concern while maintaining 
its uncommitted posture in WWII, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in Sept 1940, through his “Destroyers for Bases 
Deal”, offered U.S. military equipment to the United 
Kingdom. Later in the same year, still uncommitted and 
maintaining the U.S. policy of isolation, he offered 
additional military equipment to Britain and its allies in 
his “Arsenal of Democracy” speech,  
As planes and ships and guns and shells are 
produced, your Government, with its defense 
experts, can then determine how best to use them to 
defend this hemisphere. The decision as to how much 
shall be sent abroad and how much shall remain at 
home must be made on the basis of our overall 
military necessities………We have furnished the 
British great material support and we will furnish 
far more in the future……..There will be no 
"bottlenecks" in our determination to aid Great 
Britain. No dictator, no combination of dictators, 
will weaken that determination by threats of how 
they will construe that determination……...  [Ref 1] 
 Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged to supply and equip 
allies with the necessary war machinery, a program proposed 
to demonstrate U.S. concern and assistance in the war.  In 
his “Four Freedoms” State of Union address to Congress in 
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January 1941, he defined the lend-lease program, which was 
based on the proposal.  The Lend-Lease Act of 1941, which 
empowered the President, under terms he deemed proper, to 
sell, lend, lease and transfer material was subsequently 
authorized by Congress.  Initially the act was used to aid 
Britain, the Commonwealth countries, and China. [Ref2: 
section3]  
Following WWII, the era of the Cold War was 
characterized by global arms transfer by both the United 
States and the Soviet Union to corresponding friends and 
allies.  Military dominance is the trademark of nations’ 
survival and is sought to gain advantage over their 
adversaries. In the effort to gain dominance, developing 
countries began to realize the benefits of being both the 
customer and stakeholder. The United States, the Soviet 
Union, China, the United Kingdom and France began building 
their military industrial complexes to fulfill their 
domestic military needs as well as equipping friends and 
allies by providing mechanisms for arms transfer. 
The commitment of the United States towards promoting 
peace and security has been evolving since WWII.  This 
commitment was translated in its foreign policy and has 
developed into what currently is referred to as Foreign 
Military Assistance. Foreign Military Assistance is an 
integral part of the United States peacetime engagement 
strategy and directly contributes to American national 
security and foreign policy objectives. The principal 
components of the program are Foreign Military Sales (FMS), 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military 
Education and Training (IMET), and transfers of Excess 
Defense Articles (EDA). 
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 Ongoing foreign military assistance efforts support 
the primary foreign policy goals of safeguarding American 
security, building American prosperity, and promoting 
American values. By enhancing the capabilities of its 
friends and allies to address conflicts, humanitarian 
crises, and natural disasters, it is less likely that 
American forces will be called upon to respond to regional 
problems. Strengthening deterrence, encouraging defense 
responsibility sharing among allies and friends, supporting 
U.S. readiness, and increasing interoperability between 
potential coalition partners through the transfer of 
defense equipment and training help security partners 
defend against aggression and strengthen their ability to 
fight alongside U.S. forces in coalition efforts. 
Therefore, when American involvement does become necessary, 
these programs help to ensure that foreign militaries can 
work more efficiently and effectively with ours rather than 
be hobbled by mismatched equipment, communications, and 
doctrine.  
  Foreign military assistance, particularly the IMET 
program, helps to promote the principles of democracy, 
respect for human rights, and the rule of law. In addition 
to making the world a safer place, the spread of democratic 
principles contributes to a political environment that is 
more conducive to the global economic development so 
critical to the nation's well-being. Thus, there is a 
genuine linkage between foreign military assistance 
programs and the day-to-day lives of Americans.  [Ref 3: 
APPENDIX M] 
 Apart from addressing the many components of the 
Security Assistance program, this project specifically 
addresses the issue of Foreign Military Sales with the aim 
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of establishing the current status of the United States 





 The United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program 
is legislated by the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 
and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976.  
 The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 is the law of 
the land on the provision of economic and military 
assistance to foreign governments. This act establishes 
that the executive branch and Congress may give funds 
(either as a grant or as a loan) to foreign governments to 
purchase newly-manufactured U.S. arms. Generally, the 
United States provides this type of financing only to 
close, long-standing military allies, or to governments 
fighting the production and trafficking of drugs intended 
for the U.S. market. 
  The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976 is the 
primary law establishing procedures on sales and transfers 
of military equipment and related services. Created by 
congressional reformers in the aftermath of the Vietnam War 
and Watergate, this law stipulates the purposes for which 
weapons may be transferred (self-defense, internal security 
and United Nations operations only) and establishes a 
process by which the executive branch must give Congress 





The AECA establishes the rationale for FMS: 
 
The Congress recognizes . . . that the United 
States and other free and independent countries 
continue to have valid requirements for effective 
and mutually beneficial defense relationships . . 
.. Because of the growing cost and complexity of 
defense equipment, it is increasingly difficult 
and uneconomic for any country, particularly a 
developing country, to fill all of its legitimate 
defense requirements from its own design and 
production base.  [Ref 4 - Section 1] 
 
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is the largest program 
element of the overall U.S. security assistance program. It 
is also the foundation for any U.S. government-sponsored 
sales of defense articles or services.  The Foreign 
Military Sales Financing Program may be used to finance FMS 
agreements (United States of America Letter of Offer and 
Acceptance (LOA)) and, in some instances, to finance 
commercially licensed exports. 
 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is a process through 
which eligible foreign governments and international 
organizations may purchase defense articles and services 
from the United States Government. The FMS government-to-
government agreement is documented on a LOA. Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) is accomplished in either FMS cash 
purchases where the purchaser pays in cash (U.S. Dollars) 
all associated costs, or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
where the U.S. Government grants/non-repayable and 
repayable loans are involved, these credit/loan 
arrangements are negotiated by the foreign government and 
the U.S. Government.  In either situation the funds that 
are required to implement the LOA must be paid or 
transferred to the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Trust Fund. 
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 Only when the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) are 
consistent with the foreign policy interests of the United 
States will Congress approve such sales, 
 
It is the sense of the Congress that all such 
sales be approved only when they are consistent 
with the foreign policy interests of the United 
States, the purposes of the foreign assistance 
program of the United States as embodied in the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended . . . 
[Ref 4: Section 1] 
  
 The overall security assistance program is under the 
supervision and general direction of the U.S. Secretary of 
State. However, the Secretary of Defense is responsible for 
administering the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.  In 
accordance with Section 42(d) of the AECA, the Secretary of 
Defense has primary responsibility for: 
 
• Determining military end-item requirements 
• Procuring military equipment in a manner which 
permits its integration with service programs 
• Supervising the training of foreign military 
personnel 
• Moving and delivering military end items 
• Within the Department of Defense, performing any 
other functions with respect to sales and 
guarantees 
 
 There are several policies, many of which have their 
roots in the AECA, which govern the FMS program. Other 
policies are found in the Security Assistance Management 
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Manual (SAMM) or DoD directives/instructions. The ones 
listed herein are considered to be the more pertinent in 
providing a background to the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
financial management and billing system from the 
perspective of the FMS customer. [Ref 5: Chapter 1 pp.2-4] 
 
• FMS Agreement  
• Standardized Documentation 
• Pricing  
• Advance Collection  
• Interest on Arrearages 
• Country Administrative Self-Sufficiency  
• DoD Management 
 
 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
 The advent of arms has been associated with the 
prevailing security environment ever since the start of 
mankind.  States began equipping themselves to prepare for 
war and continued strengthening by virtue of perceived 
threats and aggression.  The two “great” wars demonstrated 
the evolution of armaments and how nations’ resources were 
being geared in support of troops waging war.  It was 
during the end of this turmoil that the world was presented 
with the invention of weaponry of mass destruction.  The 
Cold War rivalry between the world’s two super powers was 
characterized by an arms race. The arsenals were 




 The United States, having the edge of economic 
superiority, was able to produce higher quality products 
and achieve superior technology as compared to Soviet 
products.  The two super powers were joined by other 
developed nations that saw the arms trade business as 
having high potential for profits.  France, the United 
Kingdom and Germany joined the race.  After its breakup, 
the Soviet Union’s market share was divided among Russia, 
the newly formed states, and other manufacturers.  Thus, 
new competitors emerged from the debris of the breakup.  
High level armament and superior technology require heavy 
investment for research and development. The U.S. was able 
to synchronize the endless needs for security with economic 
prosperity domestically.  The U.S. saw the arms market as 
an avenue for it to achieve economies of scale.  It enables 
the local defense industrial base to produce weapons and 
conduct research and development.  It supports the 
industrial base by financing projects and consolidating 
external and internal arms requirements, thus achieving 
high quality and superior technology products at a much 
lower cost. 
 The United States has always been the leader of arms 
exporters, compared to other suppliers.  The changes in the 
global security environment (Cold War, Gulf Wars and the 
September 11 incidents) have incited growing trends of arms 
exports.  These changes in the security environment bear 
great impact on the U.S. FMS.  For example, after the 1990 
Gulf War, the U.S. FMS agreements went up to $31.109 
Billion in 1993, compared to only $8.78 B in 1989 and 
$16.614 B in 1990. [Ref 6: Document No. 7] 
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The principal U.S. component of arms export is through 
Security Assistance components of Foreign Military Sales 
(FMS).  Another significant means of export is through 
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS).  DCS affects the FMS 
program, as both share the same pie.  Foreign customers 
have essentially two choices available to them for 
acquiring U.S. defense items - Foreign Military Sales and 
Direct Commercial Sales. Under the current process, a 
firewall exists between them, creating an either/or 
proposition for the foreign buyer-purchase, either through 
Direct Commercial Sales or through FMS. 
The Direct Commercial Sales route has obvious 
benefits, the greatest of which is a simplified process 
wherein the buyer deals directly with the defense firm. 
However, there are costs as well. First, the buyer is 
restricted to purchasing only those items available on the 
open commercial market. Second, and of most interest, the 
foreign buyer is often left to the devices of the defense 
firm. For example, an unexperienced foreign buyer may lack 
negotiation skills and knowledge of the product, 
specifications, and the U.S. contracting system. This 
situation may allow the defense firms to take advantage of 
these buyers to gain more profit. These types of incidents 
have been reported by the Subcommittee on Oversight and 
Investigations in the 103rd Congress Energy and Commerce 
Committee. 
 
In response to the evidence developed by this 
Subcommittee of widespread fraud in the Direct 
Commercial Sales from U.S. defense contractors to 




 Experienced foreign buyers can usually avoid 
pitfalls, but new players in the game of defense purchasing 
often fall prey. Therefore, and somewhat counter-
intuitively, new recipients are increasingly demanding to 
go the way of Foreign Military Sales rather than Direct 
Commercial Sales.  
There is another reason for favoring Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS). Not only does the recipient have the U.S. 
government acting as its purchasing agent, but it also 
benefits from the U.S. government-provided sustainment 
packages that often are linked to FMS purchases as an 
attempt to sweeten the deal. Table 1 simplifies the 
"pleasure and pain" typically associated with Foreign 
Military Sales and Direct Commercial Sales. [Ref 7: p.7] 
 
TABLE 1 
Differences between Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and 
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) 
 
 Positive aspects Negative aspects 
FMS • Buyer receives 
automatic export 
license and access 
to U.S. government 
stock 
• Buyers can purchase 
major hardware 
package 




closure is slow 
• Sale is slow if item 
is not in stock 
• FMS has many back 
orders  




 • Sale leaves "no dangling dollars" 
and has no federal 
acquisition 
surcharge 
• Sale is perceived as 
quicker 
• Export license 
requirements take 
time 
• Buyers have no 
access to U.S. 
government stock 




 The policy-makers (the Administration and the 
Congress) maintain a list of recipients of weapon systems 
through U.S. FMS programs that adhere to National Security 
Policies. This list is continuously updated (adding and 
freezing of countries) depending on contemporary relations 
and whether they are in line with U.S. interests. This is 
an extension of the Cold War mentality and, as such, it may 
drive customers and potential customers away from the U.S.   
For example, before 1979 when Iran was under the Shah, the 
relationship between Iran and U.S. was good, and Iran was 
included on the recipient list. However, after the takeover 
of the Islamic regime led by Ayatollah Khomeini, all 
relationships were severed, eliminating Iran's FMS 
eligibility.  This change was seen as the creation of a 
virtual defensive envelope against a perceived threat from 
U.S. supplied arms that could be used against the U.S.   
 Other aspects that affect the FMS program are the 
intricacies within the labyrinth of the decision making 
process, the changing of administrations, and the personal 
interest of congressmen in support of particular interest 
groups.  Further confusing the U.S. position on arms 
transfers is the Clinton Administration’s 1995 official 
arms sales policy pronouncement. This policy stated that in 
determining whether permission should be granted for a 
weapons manufacturer to sell to a foreign market, "the 
impact on U.S. industry and the defense industrial base" 
should be considered. The following year an advisory 
committee recommended that this policy be discontinued 
because "arms transfers made for economic reasons would 
undercut and perhaps even preclude restraint efforts." 





 This part of the chapter discusses one of the most 
important aspects affecting the United States Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) program at the strategic decision 
making level.  FMS involves high stakes that can have a 
significant effect on the national interest (foreign 
policy), national defense, and the economy. Large sums of 
money, either from the United States Government or from the 
purchaser (foreign government), can be at stake. 
 The U.S. Constitution created the legislative branch 
(the Congress) and the executive branch (the 
Administration). The powers of one branch can be challenged 
by the other through a system of checks and balances. [Ref 
11: Article I and II]    This chapter discusses the 
responsibilities provided by the relevant laws, decision- 
making processes and the procedures for Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) involving the President, the Congress, the 
Department of State (DoS), the Department of Defense (DoD), 
and other implementing agencies.  
 
1. President’s Responsibility 
 
 The President must submit to Congress the Annual 
Estimate and Justification for Proposed Arms Sales, known 
popularly as the "Javits Report", which includes: 
 
•  An Arms Sales Proposal listing all probable 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Direct Commercial 
Sales (DCS) exports for the current calendar year 
that exceed:  
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o $7 million for major weapons or weapons-
related defense equipment; or  
o $25 million for other weapons or weapons-
related defense equipment;  
• An indication of which sales or licenses are most 
likely to be approved during the current year;  
• An estimate of the total amount of FMS sales and 
DCS licenses expected to be made to each foreign 
country; and  
• Other information about the status and rationale 
of FMS and DCS sales  
 
 Though not classified, the Javits Report has never 
been released to the public. 
 As part of a report submitted in accordance with 
section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-
195, or the "FAA"), as amended, each February the President 
must list the dollar value and quantity of defense articles 
furnished under FMS in the previous fiscal year.   
 Section 36(a) of the AECA requires the President to 
submit a quarterly unclassified report to Congress that 
includes: 
 
•  A Listing of all LOAs for major defense equipment 
exceeding $1 million;  
•  A Listing of all LOAs accepted during the current 
fiscal year, together with the total value of all 
sales to each country that year;  
•  Projections of dollar amounts of expected FMS for 
the rest of the quarter and the rest of the year; 
and 
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•  Other information about the status of FMS and DCS 
sales. [Ref.9: Chapter 9] 
  
2. U.S. Congress’ Responsibility 
 
The Congress possesses and exercises the basic 
constitutional power to authorize the military assistance 
grant and sales programs.  This authority fundamentally 
resides in Section 8, Article I of the Constitution, which 
assigns Congress the power: [Ref 10: p.22] 
 
[3] To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, 
and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes; [Ref 11: Section 8, Article I] 
 
  An ultimate goal of the United States continues to be 
a world which is free from the terrors of war and the 
dangers and burdens of armament, while simultaneously 
recognizing that the United States and the other free and 
independent countries continue to have valid requirements 
for effective and mutually beneficial defense 
relationships.  Thus, in order to pursue this ultimate 
goal, Congress’ main responsibility is to exercise 
legislative control and oversight mechanisms associated 
with the conduct of U.S. military assistance.  Congress 
exercises a range of other more explicit oversight 
measures, which take the form of "constraint, restriction, 




3. Decision Making 
 
a. Executive Branch  
 
     The President has delegated most aspects of 
decision- making regarding FMS to the State Department. 
Within the State Department the responsible agency is the 
Office of Defense Trade Controls (DTC).  This agency 
controls the export and temporary import of defense 
articles and services by taking final action on license 
applications and other requests for approval for defense 
trade exports and retransfers, and handling matters related 
to defense trade compliance, enforcement and reporting. 
The responsibilities of DTC include: 
• Maintaining the Register of US legal entities 
entitled to manufacture and/or trade in 
munitions;  
• Issuing licenses;  
• Notifying Congress of export cases of particular 
military significance or crossing certain 
thresholds specified in legislation;  
• Coordinating with other government agencies to 
ensure compliance with the AECA and ITAR;  
• Providing education, training and guidance to the 
US defense industry on compliance with AECA and 
ITAR;  
• Providing education, training and guidance to 
foreign countries that request assistance in 
establishing export control systems. [Ref 12]  
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b. Decision Making Process 
  
DTC only considers license applications from 
legal entities (firms or individuals) on the Registration 
List that it maintains.  DTC makes a case-by-case 
evaluation of valid license applications. There is not a 
country/item matrix that dictates approval or denial of any 
given application. 
 To assist in evaluation, DTC maintains a manual 
for licensing purposes, which is compiled at the country 
level. That is, there are guidelines to assist the 
evaluating officer for each country. The manual is compiled 
taking into account contributions from other government 
agencies related to their own field of expertise. For 
example, the responsible agency within the Department of 
Defense may provide information about items or 
capabilities, which would be of concern if transferred to a 
given country. 
 Where necessary, DTC also refers specific 
applications to other government agencies for review and 
comment. Depending on the nature of the proposed transfer, 
this review can include other offices within the State 
Department (such as country desks or specialists in arms 
control), the Department of Commerce, the Department of 
Defense, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and 
specialist agencies such as NASA. 
 The State Department has its own guidelines 
against which applications are judged. Other agencies are 
also encouraged to provide their views on what kinds of 
factors and criteria might require license denial. These 
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factors and criteria are then used to help DTC decide which 
applications should be referred for inter-agency review.   
 After a decision has been made, there is an 
appeals procedure if the applicant feels that the wrong 
decision has been taken. 
 
c. The Role of Congress 
 
 The AECA mandates congressional involvement in 
the decision making process for arms exports. The State 
Department notifies Congress of two types of arms export: 
• All exports of defense articles or services sold 
under a contract worth $50 million or more;  
• All exports of Major Defense Equipment sold under a 
contract in the amount of $14 million or more  
 To determine what should be reported, the State 
Department uses a definition of Major Defense Equipment 
developed in the Department of Defense. 
 
The information submitted to Congress includes: 
 
• The name of the buyer country or international 
organization;  
• A description of the article or service including 
its acquisition cost;  
• The name of the proposed recipient;  
• The reasons why the transfer is necessary;  




Arms produced under a U.S. production license in 
countries other than the United States must also be 
reported to Congress if they meet these criteria, 
regardless of whether the United States or the country 
where manufacture takes place initiates the export. 
Congress is notified at least 30 days before a license 
is approved or issued. In this 30-day period Congress may 
enact a joint resolution blocking the export or blocking 
the granting of the license. However, this is very rare.  
Although not required by law, at the beginning of each year 
the State Department submits a list of anticipated major 




 This Chapter establishes the fact that arms transfer 
is a business that will remain as a most attractive and 
profitable business for a long time as in dictated by 
history.  It illustrates that U.S. arms transfers are used 
as an instrument of foreign policy based on U.S. security 
interests.  Arms transfers develop into Foreign Military 
Sales (FMS) as part of the Arms Export Control Act.  These 
interests are provided for by various Acts governing 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and decided upon by the 
President and his Administration as they react to changes 
in the foreign policy. 
 This chapter discussed Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), 
the recipients of Foreign Military Sales (FMS), the change 
in the security environment, other foreign arms suppliers, 
and the decision-makers as the factors that have direct 
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effect on the status of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program.   
 Lastly, it also described the amount of control and 
over-sight present in the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
decision-making process.  It is like a network of control 
as decisions interlink on their way through the many 
stakeholders.  This network of control is sufficient to 
avoid unwanted transfers and sales of arms and diffusion of 














































III. GLOBAL ARMS COMPETITION 
 
 
A. THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY/NATIONAL 
SECURITY STRATEGY (NSS) AS IT PERTAINS TO ARMS 
EXPORT 
 
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and military 
structure are shaped by the interaction of a number of 
influences, many of which defy precise identification.  The 
international environment is an important and constantly 
changing influence on US policy.  U.S. strategy is largely 
a response to perceived and actual threats to American 
interests and objectives that exist in the international 
arena.  The perception of international threats to U.S. 
core values and interests is the basis for the formulation 
and execution of the national security policy.   
The policy is also heavily influenced by domestic 
politics.  The internal environment determines the amount 
of effort that a society devotes to foreign and defense 
policy.  The impact of domestic politics is seen most 
heavily in the budgetary process, but it is also felt in 
such areas as the industrial base and the manpower policy.  
Technology is another major variable in the interaction of 
influences that determine security policy.  What is 
possible in American national security is in considerable 
part determined by the technological capabilities of both 
the United States and its adversaries. [Ref 12: pp.64-65]  
The influences that these have on the NSS of the U.S. have 
been significant. Since it started as an independent 
nation, the U.S. has developed a NSS that has gone from a 
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policy of isolationism, to containment, to a policy of 
preemptive action. [Ref 12: pp. 66-88] 
During the early stages of the Cold War, the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 governed arms transfers.  This act 
also served as the cornerstone for future weapons 
transfers. [Ref 13]  Congressional sanctions of aid to 
Greece and Turkey marked the beginning of a long and 
enduring bipartisan Cold War foreign policy.    This act 
provided the legal means for the United States to sell or 
transfer weapons to foreign governments that supported its 
national security objectives. It has its roots in the 
Truman Doctrine of containment.  An extension to this 
doctrine, the Marshall Plan, was devised to help restore 
the war-shattered economies of Europe. [Ref 12 – pp. 68-69] 
By 1969, President Nixon proposed an idea through the 
Nixon Doctrine that the United States would use arms 
transfers as a means to contain Soviet influence.  The 
rationale was that arming friendly nations would allow them 
to defend themselves without having to risk American lives. 
As a means to restrain the presidential ability to transfer 
weapons to other nations, the 1976 Arms Export Control Act 
was passed. This Act gives the Congress veto power over 
arms sales and extends the notification period from 20 to 
30 days from the day of submission to the Congress. [Ref 4]   
In 1977, President Jimmy Carter issued Presidential 
Directive (PD)-13 which requires that arms transfers be 
directly linked to furthering US security interests and 
ties them very closely to the human rights records of the 
recipient governments.  PD-13, which aimed to reverse the 
Nixon Doctrine, placed limits on the dollar amounts of the 
sales, prohibited the United States from introducing more 
sophisticated weapons into a region than those already 
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present, and limited US production of weapons that were 
developed exclusively for export. Due to inconsistencies in 
applying PD-13, the Carter presidency met with great 
opposition even from within the ranks of his 
administration. To illustrate the inconsistencies of his 
arms policies, he restricted aircraft sales to Latin 
America but he proposed one of the largest aircraft sales 
deals to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in the spring of 
1978. [Ref 24: Carter, Iran and CATT, p. H009]   
President Ronald Reagan framed weapons transfer as “an 
essential element of our global policy”. [Ref 14: p. h6010] 
That approach was considerably different from his 
predecessor. He subsequently reversed many of the 
limitations imposed by PD-13. The Reagan administration 
sought to rearm the United States and its allies and to 
support anticommunist insurgencies throughout the world.  
Consistent with this policy, the Reagan administration 
raised no objection to French sales of advanced missiles 
and aircraft, or Brazilian sales of multiple-launch rocket 
systems to Iraq. In a further effort to pull Baghdad out of 
the Soviet orbit, Reagan and later Bush authorized the sale 
to Iraq of $1.5 billion worth of sophisticated U.S. 
scientific and technical equipment-much of which has 
apparently been used in developing conventional, nuclear, 
and chemical weapons. Indeed, so eager was Washington to 
forge links with Iraq that Reagan and Bush continued to 
allow deliveries of such equipment even after it had become 
evident that this technology was being diverted for 
military purposes, and long after Iraq had used chemical 
weapons in attacks on Iran and its own Kurds. [Ref 14: p. 
h6010]  
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As a presidential candidate, Bill Clinton proposed to 
curb the sales of U.S. weaponry. Early in his presidency, 
he took some initiatives in that direction. In a February 
1995 fact sheet, the White House cited "control, restraint 
and transparency" as critical elements of the Clinton 
administration's arms transfer policy. The following year, 
Congress passed H.R. 3121, a law that increased the level 
of openness around U.S. arms exports. Congress listed 
action on ten issues that could be taken that year to build 
on that progress and further assist the Clinton policy.  
The issues are as follows: [Ref 15] 
• Issue 1. Eliminate the Defense Export Loan 
Guarantee Program  
• Issue 2. Prohibit offsets on exports financed in 
whole or in part by U.S. military aid 
• Issue 3. Repay taxpayers for public funds 
expended to research and develop weapons, which 
are exported abroad and consolidate 
responsibility for collecting those funds 
• Issue 4. Amend Section 655 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act to include data on commercial 
sales deliveries and place the "655 Report" on-
line 
• Issue 5. Amend Sections 36(a) and (b) of the Arms 
Export Control Act (AECA) and Section 655 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act to require notification 
and reporting on offsets 
• Issue 6. Hold hearings on arms export licensing, 
end-use monitoring programs, and conventional 
weapons proliferation 
• Issue 7. Amend Sections 36(b) and (c) of the AECA 
to require congressional notification of all 
small arms and light weapons exports 
• Issue 8. Amend Sections 502B and 581 of the 
Foreign Assistance Act and to include all 
military training programs, including those not 
primarily designed to train foreign soldiers 
• Issue 9. Standardize U.S. arms export systems 
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• Issue 10. Ratify the OAS Convention against 
Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Small 
Arms 
Later, when he was faced with losing countless 
defense-related jobs, Clinton’s approach quickly changed, 
and was translated into the Administration’s five key 
policy goals as follows: 
 
1) To ensure that our military forces can continue 
to enjoy technological advantages over potential 
adversaries;  
2) To help allies and friends deter or defend 
themselves against aggression, while promoting 
interoperability with U.S. forces when combined 
operations are required;  
3) To promote regional stability in areas critical 
to U.S. interests, while preventing proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and their missile 
delivery systems;  
4) To promote peaceful conflict resolution and arms 
control, human rights, democratization and other 
U.S. foreign policy objectives;  
5) To enhance the ability of the U.S. defense 
industrial base to meet U.S. defense requirements 
and maintain long-term military technological 
superiority at lower costs [Ref 16] 
  
   In 1996, 79 members of the U.S. House of 
Representatives sent President Clinton a letter suggesting 
that the 1977 ban on fighter aircraft contained in PD-13 
was no longer appropriate under prevailing conditions.  
These ideas enjoyed bipartisan support by those who 
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believed that these sales would actually be good for the 
region by claiming that other nations were more than 
willing to peddle their military wares in the Americas, so 
lifting the moratorium and subjecting proposed arms sales 
to the strict checks of the State Department would increase 
our influence over who buys arms in Latin America. [Ref 17] 
   From the period of Richard Nixon to Bill Clinton, it 
was an article of faith for executive branch policy makers 
that U.S. weapons exports were only to be made to 
responsible allies who used these systems for legitimate 
defensive purposes.  It was documented that U.S. had 
supplied weapons to 50 ethic and territorial conflicts 
during that period.  Contrary to the conventional wisdom in 
Washington, official U.S. government data on arms transfers 
provide overwhelming circumstantial evidence that U.S. 
supplied weaponry is at the center of many of today's most 
dangerous and intractable conflicts: 
 
• From 1984 to 1994, parties to 45 conflicts took 
delivery of over $42 billion worth of U.S. 
weaponry; - Of the significant ethnic and 
territorial conflicts going on during 1993-94, 
90% (45 out of 50) of them involved one or more 
parties that had received some U.S. weaponry or 
military technology in the period leading up to 
the conflict; 
• In more than half of current conflicts (26 out of 
50), the United States has been a significant 
arms supplier, accounting for at least 5% of the 
weapons delivered to one party to the dispute 
over a five year period; 
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• In more than one-third of all current conflicts 
(18 out of 50), the United States has been a 
major supplier to one party to the dispute, 
accounting for over 25% of all weapons imported 
by that participant in the most recent five year 
period; 
• Despite the popular perception that it is U.S. 
policy to cease deliveries of weapons once a 
conflict is under way, as of the end of 1993 the 
United States was shipping military goods and 
services to more than half (26 out of 50) of the 
areas where there were wars being fought; [Ref 
18]  
 
In a number of volatile areas the United States was 
the primary supplier to governments that were involved in 
ongoing conflicts. In Turkey (76%), Spain (85%), Israel 
(99%), Morocco (26%), Egypt (61%), Chad (27%), Somalia 
(44%), Liberia (40%), Kenya (25%), Pakistan (44%), the 
Philippines (93%), Indonesia (38%), Guatemala (86%), Haiti 
(25%), Colombia (28%), Brazil (35%), and Mexico (77%), the 
United States was the primary supplier of imported weaponry 
in the most recent five year period (1990-1994) for which 
full data are available. [Ref 18] 
Eager to reward and reinforce America’s allies in the 
war on terrorism, the current U.S. President, George W. 
Bush, has stepped up military assistance to allies, old and 
new. Restrictions on military aid and arms transfers to 
regimes involved in human rights abuses, support for 
terrorism, or nuclear proliferation (India and Pakistan) 
were lifted for a number of countries in exchange for their 
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support in the administration’s war on terrorism. To 
enhance this development, on March 24, 2004, a bill was 
introduced to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to 
require that only countries that have a democratic form of 
government and that support United States nonproliferation 
objectives may be designated as major non-NATO allies for 
purposes of that Act and the Arms Export Control Act. [Ref 
19]  
 About $5 billion of the $25.4 billion International 
Affairs budget request for FY 2003 was officially 
designated for the war on terrorism. [Ref 20] This 
included: 
 
• $3.4 billion for programs such as IMET, FMF, and 
ESF; 
• $88 million for programs in Russia and other 
former Soviet Union states; 
• $50 million for the IAEA; and  
• $69 million for counter-terrorism programs, 
including training and equipment to help other 
countries fight global terror  
 
The 2003 Economic Support Fund (ESF) budget request 
was $2.29 billion. Top recipients included: $600 million 
for Israel, $615 million for Egypt, $200 million for 
Pakistan, $60 million for Indonesia, and $25 million for 
India. The 2003 FMF budget request of $4.107 billion 
included $2.1 billion for Israel, $1.3 billion for Egypt, 
$20 million for the Philippines, $50 million for Pakistan, 
$50 million for India, and $98 million for Colombia. This 
year’s $80 million IMET budget request represents a 27.5% 
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increase over 2001. Top recipients include major allies in 
the war on terrorism: India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, 
Philippines, Jordan, Oman, and Yemen. [Ref 20] 
The following funds were doled out (charity) as part 
of the emergency supplemental bills: $600 million in ESF 
for Pakistan; $40.5 million in economic and law enforcement 
assistance for Uzbekistan; $45 million in FMF for Turkey 
and Uzbekistan; $45.5 million for Non-proliferation Anti-
terrorism De-mining and Related Programs (NADRP); $42.2 
million for training and equipment for border security 
forces in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, 
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan; $108 million for a 
variety of counter-terrorism training programs and de-
mining in Afghanistan. The FY 2002 Supplemental (Pl-107-
206) included $665 million for ESF, $387 million for FMF, 
$110 million for Assistance for Independent States of the 
former Soviet Union, and $88 million for NADRP ($12 million 
of which will go to Indonesia). [Ref 20] 
American interests and values have always been the 
fundamental considerations of U.S policy on who receives 
military assistance.  Israel has been the top recipient 
since its foundation, as U.S support to it is essential to 
maintain the credibility of U.S commitments abroad.  The 
intensity of the American commitment to Israel’s security 
is often more a function of U.S domestic politics than 
strategic reasoning. [Ref 12: p.401]  
The U.S. interests in the East and Southeast Asia and 
its strategic goal to contain Communism, result in military 
aid to countries involved in the Vietnam War.  For example, 
during that War programs were implemented to quickly 
transfer arms to nations involved in the war.  Between 1965 
and 1975, Korea, Laos, the Philippines, Thailand and 
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Vietnam received equipment and services valued at more than 
$18 Billion.  [Ref 21: pp. 6-7] 
 
Table 2: 
Top Ten Recipients of Foreign Military Sales Contracts by 
Congressional District FY 1996 
    
 State and largest 
city 




1 2nd CD Missouri    
(St. Louis)  
$5.2 billion 
(39%)  
McDonnell Douglas,  
F-15, F-18 fighters 
2 26th CD Texas      
(Dallas-Fort 





3 23rd CD Florida    
West Palm Beach)  
$ 625 million 
(5%)  
United Technologies, 
engines for F-16, F-15
4 12th CD Texas      
(Fort Worth)       




5 5th CD Arizona     
(Mesa) 




6 6th CD Arizona     
(Tucson)           
$ 300 million 
(2%)  
GM-Hughes, 
AMRAAM, TOW missiles 
7 5th CD 
Massachusetts   
(Lawrence, Lowell) 





8 6th CD 
Massachusetts      
(Lynn) 
$ 242 million 
(2%) 
General Electric, 
engines for F-16, F-18
9 2nd CD California  
(Chico, Redding)   




10 8th CD Florida     
(Orlando) 




Total, Top Ten Districts  $ 9.1 billion (70%) 
Source: Department of Defense contract data tapes, analyzed by Eagle 
Eye Services of Vienna, Virginia. 
 
 
Interest groups have always been major influencing 
factors that affect the arms transfer policy, through 
pressure exerted on the decision-makers. The arms 
industries are excellent at providing rationale that ties 
together the U.S. economy, acquiring a technological edge, 
and maintaining and enhancing our own forces. That allows 
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them to remain in business and to make profits.  The States 
and congressional districts lobby for more sales of the 
arms that are produced in their districts because of the 
perceived widespread economic benefits. Table 2 shows the 
top ten recipients of FMS contracts by congressional 
district. 
Specific country’s relations sometimes make the 
President give promises to provide military assistance that 
might be against the arms transfer policy as a gesture to 
promote future interest with that country.  For example, in 
1992, President Bush promised to normalize arms sales to 
Taiwan that could very well help them resist a naval 
blockade. [Ref 22] 
 
 
B.  FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF) PROGRAM 
OVERVIEW 
 
The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program is a U.S. 
government program for financing arms exports through 
grants or loans for the acquisition of U.S. military 
articles, services, and training.  It supports U.S. 
regional stability goals and enables U.S. friends and 
allies to improve their defense capabilities. Congress 
appropriates FMF funds in the International Affairs Budget, 
the Department of State allocates the funds for eligible 
friends and allies; and the Department of Defense executes 
the program.  FMF helps countries meet their legitimate 
defense needs, promotes U.S. national security interests by 
strengthening coalitions with friends and allies, cements 
cooperative bilateral military relationships, and enhances 
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interoperability with U.S. forces.  Because FMF monies are 
used to purchase U.S. military equipment and training, FMF 
contributes to a strong U.S. defense industrial base, which 
benefits both America’s armed forces and American workers. 
On average, 75% of all U.S. arms sales go via the FMS 
channel each year, with the rest going as commercial sales 
licensed by the State Department. Services, spares, and 
training are often more lucrative than the underlying 
system they are supporting. That explains why the United 
States can sell 72 F-15s to Saudi Arabia for $9 billion, 
even though the cost of the planes alone (at $40 million to 
$50 million each) would add up to "only" $3 billion to $3.5 
billion.  [Ref 23] 
 
President George W. Bush’s announcement in the 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
on Sep 17, 2002 stresses that Foreign aid is an essential 
part of US foreign policy: 
To defeat this threat we must make use of 
every tool in our arsenal—military power, 
better homeland defenses, law enforcement, 
intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off 
terrorist financing. The war against 
terrorists of global reach is a global 
enterprise of uncertain duration. America 
will help nations that need our assistance in 
combating terror. And America will hold to 
account nations that are compromised by 
terror, including those who harbor 
terrorists— because the allies of terror are 
the enemies of civilization. The United 
States and countries cooperating with us must 
not allow the terrorists to develop new home 
bases. Together, we will seek to deny them 
sanctuary at every turn”…”Use our foreign aid 
to promote freedom and support those who 
struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that 
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nations moving toward democracy are rewarded 
for the steps they take. [Ref 24: 
Introduction] 
 
During the period 1990 to 2003, the total 
appropriation for FMF was $54.9 Billion with an average 
annual appropriation of $3.9 Billion.  The maximum amount 
during the period was $4.727 Billion in 1990 and the 
minimum was $3.369 Billion in 1999 (Appendix A).  The 
number of countries benefiting from the FMF program also 
varies (from 26 in 1995 to 56 in 2003) (Chart 2).  
Chart 1: 
Appropriated FMF for Europe 1990-2003 









1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Greece+Turkey+Portugal All Others
Source: Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Security Assistance 




































Source: Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Security Assistance 
Database Search, http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid_db.htm 
 
 
FMF shifts from and within regions depending on US 
interest in a particular period and the changing security 
environment.  For example, in Europe, Greece, Turkey and 
Portugal were major recipients of FMF before 1990. By 1998, 
they were receiving no FMF, as the U.S interest in the area 
became a lesser priority.  FMF was reinstated for Turkey in 
2001 and 2002, due to the country’s support of U.S. policy 
on the global war on terrorism.  On the other hand, U.S. 
policy makers saw the opportunity that emerged from the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, especially those countries 
from the Balkans, and shifted FMF to these areas (Appendix 
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A).  These countries started receiving FMF as early as 1995 
and the trends are growing (Chart 1).  
These shifting priorities also explain the increase in 
the number of FMF recipients (Chart 2).  The U.S. interest 
in the Balkans was also associated with combating terrorism 
and as such, there was an increase in FMF appropriations to 
those countries in 2001 and 2002. [Ref 25] 
After September 11, 2001, the number of foreign 
countries receiving FMF program funding was increased due 
to the political situation the United States was facing and 
the desperate need for support from allies to combat 
terrorism. The increase in the number of countries is in 
large part due to the new developing nations separated from 
the former Soviet Union (Table 3). 
The trends of FMS and FMF in the period 1990 – 2003 
are almost in consonant despite the spike in FMS in 1993 
due to the 1st Iraqi war.  FMS sales are almost double the 
FMF amount due to cash sales. The United States has revised 
the list of countries that are ineligible to receive U.S. 
weapons (Chart 2). Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States 
has waived restrictions on arms or military assistance to 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, India, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and 
Yugoslavia. 
Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has made 
billions of dollars worth of arms deals to strategic 
countries, including a $1.2 billion sale of fighter jets 
and missiles to Oman and nearly $400 million worth of 
missiles to Egypt. Countries identified as fighting 
terrorist groups are also set to receive large shipments of 
military aid, including $92 million in weapons to the 
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The FMF program is a reflection of the US foreign 
policy. The Administration and the Congress must both agree 
based on information provided by various US agencies 
(mostly from DoS and DoD) that the military aid (FMF) is in 
parallel with the strategic goals of U.S. national 
security. Since the Camp David treaty between the Arabs and 
Israel in 1974, approximately 50% of the FMF financing has 
gone to Israel and 33% to Egypt. At the same time, FMF has 
provided steady, average annual funding of $3.9 B for the 














1 Israel 26,932,260 49.05% 
2 Egypt 18,194,410 33.14% 
3 Turkey 3,313,400 6.04% 
4 Greece 2,223,130 4.05% 
5 Jordan 882,254 1.61% 
6 Portugal 455,635 0.83% 
7 Philippines 409,375 0.75% 
8 Colombia 306,434 0.56% 
9 Poland 266,062 0.48% 
10 Pakistan 184,369 0.34% 
 
Source: Federation of American Scientists, U.S. Security Assistance 
Database Search, http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid_db.htm 
 
Of course there are both supporters and opponents of 
foreign aid within the Congress.  Interest groups and 
activists on both sides affect the decision making of the 
sub-committees.  That is why those countries benefiting 
from the FMF program have strong lobbyists to defend their 
case. 
The true financial beneficiaries of FMF funding are 
not the recipient countries but the U.S. defense 
contractors. Although Israel is allowed to spend a small 
portion of its FMF funding on weapons procurement within 
Israel, most FMF program dollars go to support big ticket 
items like Egypt's purchase of Lockheed Martin F-16 fighter 
planes and General Dynamics M-1 tanks or Israel's import of 
McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighters. In these instances, the 
FMF program is simply a roundabout way of funneling money 
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from U.S. taxpayers into the coffers of major arms 
exporting firms.  In many cases, the funds never leave the 
United States, but are held in the Pentagon's Foreign 
Military Sales trust fund and issued to U.S. companies as 
defense contracts as their work on a given foreign order 
proceeds. [Ref 23] 
Military assistance programs reflect increasing 
congressional involvement in the direction and details of 
U.S. foreign policy through its control of the foreign-
operations budget. When the executive and legislative 
branches agree on the objectives and the concepts for using 
FMF as an instrument of policy, proactive assistance tends 
to take place and affects fewer countries at lower levels 
of funding (Appendix A). Many foreign governments, aware of 
Congress's influential role, have begun to make their case 
strongly on Capitol Hill as well as to U.S. ambassadors. 
While there is some flexibility in this category of policy 
instruments, it is found in programs that are outside the 
formal Foreign Operations budget process: in Foreign 
Military Sales and, particularly, in Direct Commercial 
Sales--programs over which State and Defense can exercise 
more independent control. [Ref 27] 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) may be used to fund 
DCS, when approved on a case-by-case basis by the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), for the purchase of 
defense articles, defense services, and design and 
construction services. However, as indicated in the 
financing agreement to which the USG and the foreign 
governments are parties, the USG is under no obligation to 
approve any specific DCS for FMF funding. 
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DCS financing comes under the review and scrutiny of 
the General Accounting Office, the DoD Inspector General, 
the Department of Justice, and the Congress. Revisions of 
the guidelines, over time, reflect DoD's effort to minimize 
vulnerability to waste, fraud, and abuse, and, where 
possible, maximize acquisition streamlining and reform 
principles. [Ref 28: p. 1] 
 
 
C. THE GLOBAL ARMS COMPETITION OVERVIEW 
 
This part of the project concentrates on the eight-
year period from 1995 to 2002, which illustrates how global 
competition for conventional arms transfers has changed in 
the post-Cold War and post-1st Iraqi War years. 
Relationships between arms suppliers and recipients 
continue to evolve in response to changing political, 
military, and economic circumstances. Nonetheless, the 
developing world continues to be the primary focus of 
foreign arms sales activity by conventional weapons 
suppliers. During the period of 1995 to 2002, conventional 
arms transfer agreements to developing nations comprised 
two thirds of the value of all international arms transfer 
agreements, which makes them the most profitable 
marketplace.  This is because they lack the industrial 
infrastructure and technology necessary for indigenous 
production, and desperately need to buy arms to defend 
themselves. Unlike developing nations, developed nations 
have the defense industrial infrastructure and technology 
necessary to build their own arms.  They will not accept 
foreign products unless the offered products are clearly 
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superior to anything their firms can provide, or when they 
do not produce those products.  
 
1.   Worldwide 
 
The value of all arms transfer agreements worldwide in 
2002 was nearly $29.2 billion. This is a decrease over 
2001, and it was the second consecutive year that total 
arms agreements declined (Chart 4)(Table 4). The United 
States led in arms transfer agreements worldwide, making 
45.5% of all agreements in 2002, up from 40.16% in 2001. 
Russia ranked second with 19.5% of these agreements 
globally, a nominal increase over 2001. Ukraine ranked 
third, its arms transfer agreements worldwide standing at 
5.4% in 2002. The United States and Russia collectively 
made agreements in 2002 valued at nearly $19 billion, 65% 
of all international arms transfer agreements made by all 
suppliers. In the period between 1995-1998, developing 
world nations accounted for 68% of the value of all 
worldwide arms transfer agreements, and 64.6% for the 
period between 1999-2002 (Tables 4, 5,6, 7, and 8). 
Due to limited financial resources, many developing 
nations have reduced their expenditures on weapons. This 
has made the competition more intense among major arms 
suppliers. Prospective arms purchasers with significant 
financial resources have been cautious in making major new 
weapons purchases under the unstable global economy.  A 
number of developing nations have placed greater emphasis 
on upgrading existing weapons systems rather than new 




In protecting their own national military industrial 
bases, developed nations limited their own arms purchases 
from one another, except for joint production or 
development of specific weapons systems.  Several arms 
supplying nations began restructuring and consolidating 
their defense industries due to competitive pressures (e.g. 
multinational mergers, joint ventures, specialized niche 
markets) as a result of the changing dynamics of the 
international arms marketplace. 
Many weapons exporting nations have focused their 
sales efforts on nations and regions where they have 
distinct competitive advantages due to longstanding 
political and military relationships. Financing and/or 
offset arrangements became key considerations in securing 
contracts with new and prospective members of NATO due to 
the lack of significant financial resources. Competition 
has been strong between U.S. and European companies in 
search of these orders, as they have the potential to 
partially compensate for sales losses elsewhere. [Ref 29: 
pp. 3-5] 
Various nations in the developed world wish to replace 
older military equipment. Yet the developing world as a 
whole has barely recovered from the Asian financial crisis 
of the late 1990’s and the notable fluctuations in the 
price of crude oil in the last few years. Traditionally 
high profile weapons purchasers in Asia and the Near East 
were greatly affected by these events and consequently have 
been cautious in seeking new arms agreements. For example, 
“Thailand ordered $600 million worth of Boeing F/A-18 
fighters and then determined it could not afford them when 
the country's economy faltered in 1997. The Thai government 
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grew reluctant to buy the F/A-18s and began looking for a 
way to cancel the purchase”. [Ref 30] 
Less affluent Developing nations (Latin American, and 
to a lesser extent African states) depend on financing 
credits and favorable payment schedules from suppliers to 
make major arms purchases.  
 
2. Developing Nations 
      
The value of all arms transfer agreements with 
developing nations in 2002 was $17.7 billion, a notable 
increase over the $16.2 billion total in 2001. However, 
this was the second lowest annual total, in real terms, 
during the 8-year period from 1995 - 2002. From 1999-2002, 
the United States, ranking first, made 41.8% of such 
agreements. Russia, the second leading supplier during this 
period, made 25.5% of such agreements. France, the third 
leading supplier, made 5.3% of such agreements. In the 
earlier period (1995-1998) the United States, ranked first, 
made 28%; Russia made 22.7%; France made over 14.4% (Chart 
4)(Tables 5, 9).  
The United States has ranked either first or second 
nearly every year in the eight-year period, and first every 
year since 1998. France has been a strong competitor for 
the lead in arms transfer agreements with developing 
nations, ranking first in 1997 and second in 1998, while 
Russia ranked first in 1995, and second in 1996 and 1999-
2002.  
Arms producers in the level below the United States, 
Russia and France, such as China, other European, and non-
European producers, have been participants in the arms 
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trade with developing nations at a much lower level. These 
suppliers are, however, capable of making an occasional 
arms deal of a significant nature. However, most of their 
annual arms transfer agreement values during 1995-2002 are 
relatively low, and are based upon smaller transactions of 
generally less sophisticated equipment (Tables 9, 10, 11). 
[Ref 29: pp. 5-6] 
The competition for arms transfers to developing 
nations in the period of 1995 – 2002 was mainly between 
U.S., Russia, and China. For ease of analysis, we grouped 
the major West European suppliers (France, United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Italy). 
 
a.    United States 
     
     The United States arms transfer agreements with 
developing nations rose notably from $6.7 billion (41%) in 
2001 to $8.6 billion (48.6%) in 2002 (Charts 4, 5 and 
6)(Tables 5, 9, 12).  The value in 2002 was primarily 
attributable to major purchases by key U.S. clients in the 
Near East and Asia.  These arms agreement totals also 
reflect: 
 
• Continuation of well-established defense support 
arrangements with purchasers worldwide 
• Highly visible sales of major weapons systems 
• Continuation of existing system upgrades  
• Agreements for a wide variety of spare parts, 




The major weapon systems agreements the United States 
concluded in 2002 with developing countries include AH-64 
Apache helicopters, F-16 C/D combat fighter aircraft, and 
Aegis combat systems for KDX-3 destroyers. The United 
States also concluded agreements to sell various missile 
systems to clients in both the Near East and Asia. These 
agreements were for AIM 120C AMRAAM missiles, Harpoon 
missiles, Hellfire missiles, TOW-2A missiles, MK41 Vertical 
launch systems, SLAM land attack missiles, AGM-84L Harpoon 
missiles, and AIM-9X Sidewinder missiles. Due to security 
reasons and the requirement to always maintain a 
technological edge over its adversaries, the U.S. only 
releases systems that are inferior to those that are used 
by its own forces. This policy affects sales as potential 
buyers turn to European suppliers, who produce systems as 
good as and sometimes better than those exported by the 
United States. [Ref 31: p 5]  
In 1999, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John J. 
Hamre, highlighted additional evidence that U.S is losing 
business to other competitors. [Ref 32]  
 
To that end, the FMS fee has been reduced from 3 
percent to 2.5 percent of the value of the sale. 
Although this makes U.S. products more 
competitive in the global market, U.S. companies 
continue to lose business to foreign competitors 
because the remaining FMS administration fees add 
to the price of U.S. goods. 
 
To make a sale, U.S. defense companies offer a variety 
of incentives, ranging from offsets to licensed production 
and joint ventures that permit a high degree of local 
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content. Increasingly, U.S. defense executives face 
difficult decisions concerning how much proprietary 
technology to share with foreign partners. [Ref 31: p 47] 
It must be emphasized that, apart from the weapons 
themselves, the sale of munitions, upgrades to existing 
systems, spare parts, training and support services to 
developing nations worldwide account for a very substantial 
portion of total value of U.S. arms transfer agreements. 
This fact reflects the large number of countries in the 
developing and developed world that have acquired and 
continue to utilize a wide range of American weapons 
systems, and have a continuing requirement to support and 
modify, as well as replace, these systems. [Ref 29: pp. 6] 
 
b.   Russia 
  
     Russia’s arms transfer agreements with developing 
nations declined from $5.4 billion (33.3%) in 2001 to $5 
billion (28.3%) in 2002. Russia ranked second in the period 
1999 – 2002 (Charts 4, 5 and 6), (Tables 5,9,11, 12). 
Russia inherited its clients from the Soviet Union, which 
accorded them with generous military assistance grants and 
deep discounts on arms purchases.  Most of these 
traditional clients are less affluent developing nations. 
The arms sales aided Russia, which wanted to sell weapons 
as a means of obtaining hard currency.  An effort has been 
made by the Russian leaders to promote procurement of 
Russian weapons by providing flexible and creative 
financing, payment options and agreements to license 
production of its weapons systems.  These agreements were 
used to secure sales with India and China, which accounted 
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for a large portion of Russia’s arms transfer agreement 
totals. 
Russia faces significant difficulties in increasing 
sales to a wider customer base, because most potential 
cash-paying buyers have been longstanding customers of 
major Western suppliers. These buyers have proven reluctant 
to replace their weapons inventories with unfamiliar non-
Western ones, when newer versions of existing equipment are 
readily available from their traditional Western suppliers. 
Some potential arms customers are uncertain whether Russian 
defense industries can be reliable suppliers of the spare 
parts and support services necessary to maintain the 
weapons systems they sell abroad. In addition, Russia has 
not shown any significant research and development programs 
for new or enhanced advanced weapons or systems.  
Russia has had a wide variety of weaponry to sell, 
from the most basic to the highly sophisticated. Various 
developing countries still view Russia as a potential 
source for their military equipment. In late 2000, Russia 
pursued major arms sales with Iran, which was a primary 
purchaser of Russian armaments in the early 1990s. It 
should also be noted that Russia has had some success in 
expanding its customer base in Asia for combat fighter 
aircraft, to Malaysia and Indonesia. Similar aircraft 
contracts have been made with Algeria and Yemen. 
Russia’s principal arms clients since 1994 have been 
India and China. Russia and India agreed to a long-range 
plan for procurement as well as coproduction of a number of 
advanced Russian weapons systems in 1999, 2000, and 2001. 
One example of these agreements was a deal in early 2001 
for India’s procurement and licensed production of T-90 
main battle tanks. A growing arms supplying relationship 
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with China began to mature in the early to mid-1990s.  In 
1996, Russia sold Su-27 fighter aircraft to China, followed 
by a licensed production agreement, permitting the Chinese 
to coproduce the aircraft. Russia also sold China 
Sovremenny-class destroyers, with associated missile 
systems, Kilo submarines, Su-30 aircraft, and S-300 PMU-2 
SAM (SA-10) systems. A variety of other contracts with 
China covered upgrades, spare parts, and support services 
associated with previously sold weapons systems. [Ref 29: 
pp. 7-8]  
 
c.   Major West European Suppliers 
      
     The major West European suppliers group 
registered a notable increase in their collective share of 
all arms transfer agreements with developing nations 
between 2001 and 2002. This group’s share rose from 5.1% 
($832 million) in 2001 to 11.9% ($2.1 billion) in 2002. The 
Group held a 19.1% share of all arms transfer agreements 
with developing nations during the period 1995 - 2002. 
During the period following the 1st Iraqi war, the 
group generally maintained a notable share of arms transfer 
agreements. This share declined to 12.5% ($11.3 billion) in 
the period between 1999-2002. Individual suppliers within 
the group have had notable years for arms agreements, 
especially France in 1995 and 1997 ($3 billion and $5 
billion; respectively). The United Kingdom also had a large 
agreement year in 1996 ($3.2 billion), and at least $1 
billion in 1997, 1998, and 1999. Germany concluded arms 
agreements totaling at least $1 billion in 1998, 1999, and 
2000, with its highest total at $2.2 billion in 1999. For 
each of these three nations, large agreement totals in one 
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year have usually reflected a very large arms contract with 
one or more major purchasers in that particular year 
(Charts 5 and 6)(Tables 9, 12). 
The group has traditionally had their competitive 
position in weapons exports augmented by strong government 
marketing support for foreign arms sales. Most members of 
the group have adopted policies to collaborate with other 
nations to share development costs, and to export top-of-
the-line weapons systems to reach affordable economies of 
scales because of the high costs of developing new weapons.  
As mentioned by French Minister of Defense, Pierre Joxe, 
1991, [Ref 33: p. A17] 
 
If you want to be able to afford to make your own 
weapons, you have to be able to sell them. 
 
The group was very successful against the U.S. and 
Russia in securing contracts with developing nations, but 
individually they faced great difficulties in securing and 
sustaining large new contracts due to the high demand for 
U.S. weapons. Because of those difficulties, some producers 
in the group phased out production of certain weapon 
systems and sought joint production ventures with other 
European or American suppliers to share future profits.  An 
example of this is projects such as the Eurofighter and the 
U.S.-British Joint Strike fighter. [Ref 29: pp. 9-10] 
Highly capable defense firms, moreover, seek strategic 
business alliances and subcontracting relationships with 
American companies as a means of penetrating the U.S. 
market, which is by far the largest and most lucrative in 
the world. Some have acquired U.S. defense firms; more 
often, they demand a share of the production of U.S. 
 55 
weapons systems and transfer of manufacturing technology as 
conditions for importing U.S. equipment. [Ref 31: p. 13] 
 
d.   China 
      
     China’s importance as an arms supplier to certain 
developing nations in the early 1980s began primarily 
through arms agreements with both combatants in the Iran-
Iraq War.  From 1995 through 2002, the value of China’s 
arms transfer agreements with developing nations averaged 
about $1 billion annually. The value of China’s arms 
transfer agreements with developing nations peaked in 1999 
at $2.7 billion. Its sales figures that year reflected 
several smaller valued weapons deals in Asia, Africa, and 
the Near East, rather than one or two especially large 
sales of major weapons systems. In 2002, China’s arms 
transfer agreements total was $300 million, its second 
lowest total over the entire 1995-2002 period. (Chart 
6)(Tables 9, 11, 13) 
Since much of Chinese military equipment is less 
advanced and sophisticated than other weaponry available in 
the market, few clients with financial resources have 
sought to purchase it. China did sell Silkworm anti-ship 
missiles to Iran, as well as other less advanced 
conventional weapons. China has sold surface-to-surface 
missiles to Pakistan, and missile technology to Iran and 
North Korea, long-standing clients. [Ref 29: pp. 8-9] 
 
 56 
D. The Impact of the Cold War, the Iraq Wars, and 
the September 11th Incidents on the Arms Export 
Program 
 
1.   The Cold War 
 
The Cold War was characterized by an arms race 
reflecting a bipolar world in which both superpowers 
dominated the lion’s share of the global arms market.  
Although the two superpowers did not directly engage each 
one another, they were in fact demonstrating their powers 
through proxy wars, building up their military strengths 
and providing arms and aid to their allies.  Concentrating 
on the last five years before the end of the Cold War (1984 
– 1988) the Russians were still leading global arms 
exports, capturing an average of 34.5% of the global arms 
market share.  While the nearest competitor, the U.S., 
managed to capture only 23.1% of the market share.  One of 
the reasons for the large Russian market share, apart from 
gaining market share from their traditional allies, was due 
to large sales to Iran and Iraq during their war.  Iraq 
enjoyed much wider support, both from Arab and Western 
nations; the Soviet Union was its largest supplier of arms. 
[Ref 34: 2001- Iran-Iraq War]  In 1987, the Soviet Union 
providing more than U.S. $8 billion worth of weapons since 
1980, was Iraq's most important arms supplier. In its 1987 
annual study, “Soviet Military Power”, the United States 
Department of Defense, while maintaining official 
neutrality in the Iran-Iraq War, stated that the Soviet 
Union had provided extensive military assistance to Iraq, 
and at the same time, continued its efforts to gain 
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leverage on Iran. In early 1987, Moscow delivered a 
squadron of twenty-four MiG-29 Fulcrums to Baghdad. [Ref 
35: Arms from the Soviet Union]  
The end of the Cold War (1988) radically transformed 
the structure of international relations and the 
environment for international defense business. The threat 
of Soviet expansionism is greatly reduced, the possibility 
of a Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe has been 
eliminated, and the Soviet Union appears to be following a 
policy of restraint in arms exports. Accordingly, the 
defense equipment requirements of the United States and its 
European Allies are diminishing significantly. Moreover, a 
principal reason why the United States transferred weapons 
and defense technology to allied and friendly nations, to 
counter Communist influence, has been reduced. [Ref 36: pp. 
3-4] 
The market share for both the U.S and Russia was a 
significant 50% - 70% from the end of the Cold War until 
2002.  The Russian’s share had always been twice the U.S 
share before the end of the Cold War.  The major impact of 
the end of the Cold War on the arms export industry was a 
decline in global arms exports, from $64.4 Billion in 1988 
to $45.7 in 1990 (chart 7), and  $37.74 Billion in 1991 
(Chart 9).   In 1988, the combined U.S and Russian market 
share was 47.3%, equally shared between the two.  The U.S. 
began surpassing Russia as the leader in arms export in 
1989, with 32.8% and 27.2% for Russia (Chart 8).  Just 
before the 1st Iraqi War (Iraq invasion of Kuwait), U.S 
market share went up to 48.13%, leaving Russia trailing at 
18.7% (Chart 10). 
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2.   The 1st Iraqi War 
 
The 1st Iraqi War was the first major conflict 
involving the U.S. after the Cold War. The U.S. managed to 
garner support from the “coalition of the willing”, mainly 
from the Gulf States and Middle East countries supporting 
the U.S. effort to liberate Kuwait.  It was also in the U.S 
interest to allow countries that supported the U.S. in the 
war to purchase U.S. weapons and provide them aid in 
preparation for defense against any Iraq aggression.  
Secretary of Defense William Cohen explained that he had to 
sell friendly Gulf States whatever they requested because 
otherwise they "would take it as an insult" and seek 
another supplier. Meanwhile, some in the Arab media allege 
that the U.S. was "exploiting the issue of the so-called 
Iraq-Iran danger" to sell more arms in the Gulf. [Ref 37] 
After the War of 1990/91, there were high hopes that a 
few blockbuster arms deals could mark the beginning of a 
sharp upswing in weapons exports to Asia and the Middle East 
that would ease the pain caused by Pentagon procurement 
cutbacks. In September 1990, shortly after the first U.S. 
troops had been deployed to Saudi Arabia, the Bush 
Administration announced a record $20 billion arms package 
for Saudi Arabia that included everything from F-15 fighter 
planes and Patriot missiles to M-1 tanks and thousands of 
military trucks. One Congressional analyst described the 
deal as "the defense industry relief act of 1990”.  
During the last eight weeks of the 1992 presidential 
campaign, President Bush announced a $6 billion sale of 150 
F-16s to Taiwan, a $9 billion sale of 72 F-15s to Saudi 
Arabia, and a $3 billion sale of M-1 tanks to Kuwait. To 
underscore their economic benefits, the two fighter plane 
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deals were announced at campaign rallies in Fort Worth, 
Texas and St. Louis, Missouri, the production sites for the 
F-16 and F-15, respectively. Greeted by defense industry 
workers who held aloft banners reading "Jobs for America -- 
Thanks Mr. President," Bush, in the home stretch of his 
campaign for a second term, cited the sales as his way of 
showing that "I care about American jobs”.  
In the short term, this renewed quest for overseas 
markets yielded impressive results. As one arms industry 
lobbyist put it, the marketing theme for U.S. companies 
during this period was "how our weapons won the Gulf War".  
Current realities dashed the optimistic post-Gulf War 
expectations regarding the ability of arms sales to bolster 
the U.S. defense industry and enhance U.S. economic 
performance. [Ref 38: p.15 and p. 57]   Formerly cash rich 
customers like Saudi Arabia have moderated their arms 
purchases with the downturn in oil prices (since reversed), 
the accumulated costs of the Gulf War, and the budget 
deficits from the post-Gulf war arms buying spree. [Ref 39]  
After the steady downward trend of the global arms 
agreement that began in 1988 and immediately after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, global arms sales rose from $37.7 
Billion in 1991 to $44.2 Billion and $43.6 Billion in 1992 
and 1993, respectively. This significant increase in the 
global arms market was primarily due to U.S. arms sales 
immediate by after the war.  This is an increase of 
approximately 8% in market share, compared to 1991.  While 
U.S sales increased, all other nations’ sales were almost 
constant during this period (Charts 9 and 10). 
After its brief upsurge in 1993, the international 
arms market resumed its steady downward trend. The 1995 
arms export policy of President Clinton that boosted the 
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share to 35.5% in 1996, a level that remained almost steady 
until 1999 (Charts 10 and 12). [Ref 40]  
 
 
3. September 11th and Global War on Terrorism 
 
 After the September 11th incidents, the National 
Security Strategy changed to preemptive action, whereby the 
U.S will strike first against any potential enemy that it 
deems a threat to the U.S. security. The U.S. war against 
terrorism requires assistance from nations all over the 
world. As such, President Bush announced that nations are 
either “with us or against us”.  Although global arms 
exports do not exhibit any significant changes in market 
trends, countries that are directly assisting the U.S in 
Afghanistan (Pakistan) and 2nd Iraqi War, and those giving 
political support (Philippines, Indonesia), were rewarded 
handsomely through military aid (EDA), ESF, FMF and 
procuring U.S. arms and weapons through FMS and DCS.  This 
is a departure from prior U.S. policy. Sixteen out of 
eighteen nations have human rights problems, were non-
democratic, or were suppressing their own people.  The 
sales agreements for the U.S. rose from $12 Billion 
(40.16%) in 2001 to $13.3 Billion (45.5%)in 2002 as a 






E.  SUMMARY 
     
U.S. interests that are translated into Foreign Policy 
and executed through NSS, remain the cornerstone of U.S. 
Security Assistance, i.e. arms transfers and arms exports 
vis-à-vis FMS and DCS funded through FMF and cash sales.  
The Congress plays an important role in exercising 
restraint and oversight for all arms exports.  Individual 
Congressional Districts and domestic Arms producers 
influence these congress decisions. 
The Security Assistance program is responding to the 
changing global security environment, which has been 
characterized by uncertainties and potential regional 
instability, namely the end of the Cold War, the Iraqi 
wars, the September 11th incident and the global war on 
terrorism.  The changing security concerns have led to 
changes in appropriations for FMF, which have shifted 
within and from region to region, increasing the number of 
recipient countries according to the contemporary security 
situation. 
       The new trends in arms exports show an increasing 












Arms Transfer Agreements Worldwide, 1995-2002 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Developing World Developed World
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 
Developing Nations, 1995-2002, September 22, 2002 
 
Chart 5: 
Arms Transfer Agreements With Developing Nations 













Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 




























Arms Transfer Agreements With Developing Nations by Major 
Supplier, 1995-2002 












1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
US Russia Major West European All Others
  
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
US 4,920 7,830 4,170 6,638 9,134 13,380 6,655 8,587 
Russia 7,631 5,331 3,714 2,376 3,982 8,624 5,407 5,000 
Major West European 4,845 4,975 6,616 5,545 5,088 3,234 832 2,100 
All Others 4,239 7,108 4,179 3,734 8,960 3,989 3,328 2,000 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 








Cumulative Trends in US Global New Arms Agreements Relative 
to Global Sales of Other Top Exporters: 1984-1990 



















1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
 
  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
All Others 2900 3300 3300 4800 4600 5300 3000 
All OE. 5200 7400 10400 8600 4100 3700 1800 
Germany 1100 400 1500 2600 1300 6000 1500 
U K 1500 19700 1600 1700 21600 1800 2100 
France 6900 3400 1900 3600 1900 4400 2900 
China 300 1400 1800 4700 2500 1600 2400 
SU/Russia 24600 20600 21000 24700 16200 15500 12100 
US 17800 16600 10600 12000 16200 18700 19900 
Total 60300 72800 52100 62700 68400 57000 45700 
Source: Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1984-1994:By Supplier 
and Recipient Region, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency website, 








US Percentage Share of Global New Arms Agreements Relative 























1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
 
  1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
All Others 4.81 4.53 6.33 7.66 6.73 9.30 6.56 
All OE 8.62 10.16 19.96 13.72 5.99 6.49 3.94 
Germany 1.82 0.55 2.88 4.15 1.90 10.53 3.28 
UK 2.49 27.06 3.07 2.71 31.58 3.16 4.60 
France 11.44 4.67 3.65 5.74 2.78 7.72 6.35 
China 0.50 1.92 3.45 7.50 3.65 2.81 5.25 
SU/Russia 40.80 28.30 40.31 39.39 23.68 27.19 26.48 
US 29.52 22.80 20.35 19.14 23.68 32.81 43.54 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Arms Transfer Deliveries and Agreements, 1984-1994:By Supplier 
and Recipient Region, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency website, 






Cumulative Trends in US Global New Arms Agreements Relative 
to Global Sales of Other Top Exporters: 1989-1996 

















1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
All Others 4350 3169 2242 2199 2242 1565 3886 5100 
All O E 5558 1995 2018 1869 961 2190 1636 1800 
Italy 725 587 448 660 427 313 1125 400 
Germany 7129 2347 1906 1649 1068 1252 1943 200 
UK 2296 2582 1233 2529 3523 1147 1023 4800 
France 1812 3521 3812 7038 5338 9075 2761 3100 
China 1692 2582 1233 2529 3523 1147 1023 4800 
Russia 18729 13615 6951 1979 2562 3859 8386 4600 
U S 11719 23877 17896 23715 23928 13456 9230 11280 
Total 54010 54275 37739 44167 43572 34004 31013 36080 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the 
Developing World, 1989-1996, Washington, Congressional Research Service 






Chart 10:  
US Percentage Share of Global New Arms Agreements Relative 























1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
 
  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
All Others 8.05 5.84 5.94 4.98 5.15 4.60 12.53 14.14 
All OE 10.29 3.68 5.35 4.23 2.21 6.44 5.28 4.99 
Italy 1.34 1.08 1.19 1.49 0.98 0.92 3.63 1.11 
Germany 13.20 4.32 5.05 3.73 2.45 3.68 6.27 0.55 
UK 4.25 4.76 3.27 5.73 8.09 3.37 3.30 13.30 
France 3.35 6.49 10.10 15.93 12.25 26.69 8.90 8.59 
China 3.13 4.76 3.27 5.73 8.09 3.37 3.30 13.30 
Russia 34.68 25.09 18.42 4.48 5.88 11.35 27.04 12.75 
US 21.70 43.99 47.42 53.69 54.92 39.57 29.76 31.26 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to the 
Developing World, 1989-1996, Washington, Congressional Research Service 





Cumulative Trends in US Global New Arms Agreements Relative 
to Global Sales of Other Top Exporters: 1995-2002 


















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
All Others 2,544 4,028 929 1,697 2,102 2,372 1,572 1,600 
All O E 2,665 4,620 2,205 2,150 6,526 3,989 3,773 3,800 
Italy 1,090 474 348 679 774 216 524 1,500 
Germany 484 237 696 5,658 4,424 1,294 1,258 1,100 
UK 969 5,805 1,161 2,263 1,549 647 419 800 
France 3,270 2,962 5,456 3,508 1,770 4,312 3,982 1,100 
China 242 1,066 1,509 1,018 3,318 647 838 300 
Russia 8,721 5,805 3,947 2,716 5,088 8,840 5,659 5,700 
U S 10,417 12,682 8,400 10,840 13,434 19,181 12,099 13,272 
Total 30,402 37,679 24,651 30,529 38,985 41,498 30,124 29,172 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing 
Nations, 1995-2002, Washington, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 






Chart 12:  
US Percentage Share of Global New Arms Agreements Relative 






















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
All Others 8.37 10.69 3.77 5.56 5.39 5.72 5.22 5.48 
All O E 8.77 12.26 8.94 7.04 16.74 9.61 12.52 13.03 
Italy 3.59 1.26 1.41 2.22 1.99 0.52 1.74 5.14 
Germany 1.59 0.63 2.82 18.53 11.35 3.12 4.18 3.77 
UK 3.19 15.41 4.71 7.41 3.97 1.56 1.39 2.74 
France 10.76 7.86 22.13 11.49 4.54 10.39 13.22 3.77 
China 0.80 2.83 6.12 3.33 8.51 1.56 2.78 1.03 
Russia 28.69 15.41 16.01 8.90 13.05 21.30 18.79 19.54 
U S 34.26 33.66 34.08 35.51 34.46 46.22 40.16 45.50 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing 
Nations, 1995-2002, Washington, Congressional Research Service (CRS), 





Arms Transfer Agreements with the World, by Supplier, 
1995-2002 
(In millions of constant 2002 U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995-2002, 




Worldwide Arms Transfer Agreements, 1995-2002 and 
Suppliers’ Share with Developing World 
(In millions of constant 2002 U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 




 Arms Transfer Agreements With Developing Nations, by Supplier, 1995-2002 
(In millions of current U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995-2002,  





Arms Transfer Agreements with the World, by Supplier, 1995-2002 
(Expressed as a percent of total, by year) 
 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1995-2002, 







 Arms Transfer Agreements with the World in 2002: 
Leading Suppliers Compared 





Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 
















Arms Transfer Agreements with Developing Nations, by Supplier, 1995-2002 
(In millions of constant 2002 U.S. dollars) 
 
 














Arms Transfer Agreements with Developing Nations, 
1995-2002:Leading Suppliers Compared 
(In millions of current U.S. dollars) 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 




Arms Transfer Agreements with 
Developing Nations in 2002: 
Leading Suppliers Compared 
(In millions of current U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 

















Arms Transfer Agreements with Developing Nations, by Supplier, 1995-2002 
(Expressed as a percent of total, by year) 
 
 






Arms Transfer Agreements with Near East, by Supplier 
(In millions of current U.S. dollars) 
 
 
Source: CRS Report for Congress, Conventional Arms Transfers to 
























































IV. FOREIGN MILITARY SALES: ANALYSIS OF THE 
CURRENT STATUS  
 
A. BUSINESS MODEL OVERVIEW 
 
     The purpose of this project is to identify the 
current status of the FMS program. Strengths, Weaknesses, 
Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis is a suitable 
model to use, because it helps generate a list of factors 
for strategic considerations. [Ref 42: p.46]  SWOT 
identifies strengths and weaknesses as internal factors and 
opportunities and threats as external factors that interact 
with the FMS program business environment.  For an external 
factor to be considered a threat or an opportunity it must 
interact with FMS.  A threat is an external interacting 
factor that impairs the efficiency of the FMS program.  An 
opportunity is an external factor whose interaction would 
provide a potential increase in FMS efficiency.  
SWOT analysis can help assess the FMS program’s 
competitive position and strategy. This analysis was based 
on two types of competitors to the FMS program, U.S. Direct 
Commercial Sales and Foreign weapons producers.   
This analysis assists in determining the status of the 
FMS program.  The analysis also recommends measures to 
expand and improve the FMS program from a business point of 
view. Even though analyzing the FMS program from the 
national security point of view is important, the 
unpredictably changing security environment and interests 




B. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
1.   Internal Strengths of the U.S. FMS Program 
 
•    The FMS program is well thought of by buyers as 
it provides secure transactions through government-
to-government obligations and the benefits it 
provides   
• The U.S. has become the acknowledged market leader, 
offering sophisticated and quality products, 
transparency, supportability, good governance and 
management, and sound business practices. It has 
well-established defense support agreements.  It 
concentrates on selling major weapons systems and 
peripheral systems, including a wide variety of 
support for those systems (upgrading, modifications, 
training, ammunition and ordnance) 
• It has well conceived functional area strategies 
with integration and coordination between the 
defense industries and U.S. Government agencies that 
support the national policy 
• Significant economies of scale have been achieved 
for both the U.S. and foreign governments due to 
consolidated requirements 
• Advertising campaigns are well managed through the 
defense representatives in U.S. embassies, at air 
shows, through the media, etc. 
• Innovation is continuously achieved through DISAM 
and SAMM training for FMS management and foreign 
buyers, in addition to website educational 
information  
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• The program exhibits strong selling capabilities due 
to the support provided by the domestic defense 
industries, creative financing programs and the 
efficient use of the human resources to manage it  
• Advanced technological, technical, legal, and 
administrative skills, and the use of political 
measures in negotiation are all key strengths  
 
2.  Internal Weaknesses of the U.S. FMS Program 
 
• Weapons sales and transfers to foreign governments 
are subjected to their support of U.S. national 
security objectives. This constrains the FMS program 
from garnering more sales 
• Releasing only weapons systems that are inferior to 
the ones being used by U.S. forces results in 
customers going to other suppliers that will supply 
them with systems as good or even better than those 
exported by U.S. 
• The FMS program is influenced by individuals (e.g. 
The President) and interest groups for 
personal/group gains and does not always contribute 
directly to national security objectives 
• Government bureaucracy results in slow procedures 
• The program is unable to expand its management 
capacity. This causes customers to wait (problem of 
back orders) and priority is given to the U.S. 
military  
• Agreements result in fixed administrative charges 
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3. Potential External Opportunities 
 
• The national policy goals serve as an opportunity 
for FMS to increase sales as they provide for the 
framework to acquire technological superiority and 
arming customers (own forces and allies) 
• There is strong capacity to serve additional 
customer groups or expand into a new markets or 
segments (developing countries – the countries that 
are not interacting with FMS, e.g. Warsaw Pact, ex-
Soviet countries)   
• There is a recognized ability to expand product 
lines to meet a broader range of customer needs 
(huge manufacturing infrastructure) 
• Licensing and offsets (co-production) could be used 
to gain more customers and prevent them from going 
to DCS systems and other foreign producers 
• Trade barriers are falling in attractive foreign 
markets (Warsaw Pact, third world, countries 
supporting the Global War On Terrorism) 
• Some rivals firms don’t have the ability to 
individually finance R&D programs for product 
improvement 
• U.S. defense firms have demonstrated the ability to 
grow rapidly in response to strong interests and 
market demand 




4. Potential External Threats 
 
• The sales and transfer of weapons to foreign 
governments are very sensitive to the global 
economic situation and oil prices.  
• Reduction or elimination of FMF and/or using it for 
DCS could impact FMS  
• Lower cost foreign competitors could enter the 
market 
• The collaboration of European arms producers and 
consolidation of the European Union coupled with 
strong government marketing support for foreign arms 
sales could significantly impact the FMS program 
• Reduction in defense industry manufacturing capacity 
will have a direct impact on the FMS program    
• Rising sales of substitute (DCS) products could 
affect the program 
• As countries deem they have sufficient security 
there will be slower market growth  
• Growth in bargaining power and changing needs of 
customers resulting from changes in regimes or 
Government policies could have a significant impact 













 This chapter analyzes the information collected in 
Chapter II and III by using the SWOT Business Model. It 
categorizes the information into four internal and external 
categories of factors to identify the present strategy and 








The Foreign Military Sales program is an enabler of 
the National Military Strategy and acts as a crucial and 
critical bridging mechanism linking the NMS and the NSS.  
The FMS program enhances security by training and equipping 
foreign forces, adding to the interoperability of those 
forces with the U.S. in coalition operations.  FMS bolsters 
U.S. prosperity by supplementing federal spending, 
reinforcing the U.S. industrial base, and supporting the 
U.S. job market. It supports the NMS by promoting peace.  
FMS will continue to be a key foreign policy tool and a 
means for promoting American values and ideals abroad and 
assisting in nation building. 
 
 Basing on the literature and our analysis, the 
following points summarize our findings: 
 
• The NSS objectives is and will always be a constraint 
on the FMS program because of shifting interests and 
the changing security environment, which in turn 
affect the number of recipients. 
• Decision-makers have a great impact on the smooth and 
quick approval or disapproval of FMS transactions due 
to their oversight and interpretation of NSS 
objectives.  Their decisions are and will always be 
subjected to the influence of interests groups (e.g. 
defense industries and congressional districts). 
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• The FMF program accounts for 25% on average of FMS 
total annual sales.  More than 90% of FMF program 
funds go to specific countries, while the remaining 
10% are distributed to other countries depending on 
current interests and changes in the security 
environment 
• There are two types of competitors to the FMS program, 
domestic (DCS) and international (Foreign Arms 
suppliers) 
 
o DCS accounts for approximately 25% of U.S. arms 
sales.  DCS is mainly used by experienced 
customers.  In the long run, most of the 
customers will become more experienced in dealing 
with U.S. systems, which may increase DCS sales. 
FMF is used to fund the DCS in some cases, which 
directly affects the FMS program sales. 
o Foreign Arms suppliers consist of two main and 
effective competitors: the Major European Group 
(U.K., France, Germany and Italy) and Russia. The 
Major European Group could potentially become a 
major threat to the U.S. arms export (FMS) 
programs, especially after the Warsaw Pact and 
other European countries enter the European 
Union.  They will be comprehensive arms 
suppliers, achieving economies of scale and scope 
through collaboration with one another, venturing 
into the U.S. arms market through joint ventures 
with U.S. manufacturers. The latter change could 
increase the prospects of European manufacturers 
acquiring the latest American technology.  On the 
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other hand, Russia’s strength is in capturing the 
market from those countries not on the U.S. list 
of recipients. It grabs at any open opportunities 
to get hard cash while applying numerous payment 
options. 
 
For the years following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the U.S. has been the leader in the arms market, 
with annual shares almost the same except for the increase 
during wars and/or conflicts.  As a commodity, the demand 
on principal weapon systems is relatively inelastic, which 
contributes to unstable weapons sales. The demand of after 
sales support is somewhat more elastic. Together, there is 
a balance in the overall demand elasticity.  The after 
sales support makes the U.S. arms export program more 
stable than other competitors. The FMS program is the main 
contributing factor to the stability of overall weapons 
sales. 
Despite this encouraging status, FMS possess no 
immunity against future likely challenges, such as the 
likely Major European Group collaboration and the prospect 




  Based on this analysis, our recommendations are geared 
towards converting weaknesses to strengths and threats to 
opportunities. The following points are recommended for FMS 
program stakeholders: 
 
• FMS must be strictly used to support NSS objectives 
and not individual or group interests. The government 
should continuously back up the defense industry 
through financing research and development programs to 
ensure continuous running and improvement of its 
production lines.   
• The U.S. government must secure a strong and adequate 
pool of customers by providing balanced FMS between 
regions and more flexible financing. It also must 
reconsider amending the administrative fixed charge so 
that it reflects the actual administrative efforts 
spent on FMS administration. It must also provide 
customers with a flexible and more responsive system 
to reduce lead times and backorders.  
• The U.S. government must be ready to release superior 
weapons systems that no other suppliers can match and 
strive to acquire even better systems through 
continuous research and development programs.  
• The government must provide adequate FMF funding to 
ensure an appropriate level of FMS sales and, at the 
same time, stop funding DCS sales. In addition, the 
government should increase and/or reallocate FMF 
funding in an effort to increase the number of 
recipients to preserve a wide customer base. 
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C. SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS 
 
1. Primary Question 
  
What is the current status of the United States 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program? 
 
The United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program 
is very strong.  Being the leader in global arm sales, the 
U.S. has future prospects to improve. However, it is also 
subject to strong challenges from foreign arms suppliers.  
 
2. Secondary Questions 
 
• What are the purposes of Foreign Military Sales and 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs and were they 
achieved? 
 
The purpose of Foreign Military Sales is to allow 
for a responsible transfer of defense articles and 
services to U.S. friends and allies, including 
international organizations and foreign governments, 
according to a set of rules and procedures determined by 
the US government.  Foreign Military Financing 
appropriated for use by close, long-standing allies, is 
used to finance purchases of U.S. weapons system through 
the FMS and DCS agreements. 
We think that the FMS program has achieved its 
purposes, but FMF program funds were not fairly 
distributed among U.S. friends and allies. 
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• What are the policies governing Foreign Military Sales 
and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and what would be 
the effects of changing these policies? 
 
The FMS and FMF programs are governed by U.S. 
foreign policy, which depends on current interests and 
the security environment as expressed by the NSS.  Any 
changes in the policy are due to the changing interests 
and security environment.  These have a direct impact on 
who will receive arms or funding.  
 
• What would be the impact of changing the Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) budget on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
program? 
 
The reduction of FMF funding would have a direct 
negative impact on FMS since it accounts for a 
significant amount of FMS sales. 
 
 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
1. What is the status of Direct Commercial Sales? 
2. What is the impact of the collaboration of European 
Union countries on U.S arms export? 
3. What would be the effect of establishing a non-










FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING (FMF)  
1990-2002 BY REGION 
 
 
Source of data: 
Federation of American Scientists,  


















Table A1: Africa Appropriated FMF 1990-2002 (In Thousands $) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Angola 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Benin 77 0 0 250 0 0 3,200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Botswana 996 2,600 0 1,800 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 1,000 
Burkina Faso 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Burundi 65 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cameroon 188 840 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 0 1,860 225 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Central African 
Republic 120 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chad 3,792 854 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Comoros 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Congo 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Congo 2,986 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cote d'Ivoire 490 2,327 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,200 500 0 0 0 0 
Djibouti 2,076 1,505 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECOMOG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Equatorial 
Guinea 319 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Eritrea 0 0 0 0 200 460 2,613 1,750 1,000 0 0 0 250 500 
Ethiopia 0 0 0 0 500 300 1,430 1,000 1,000 2,900 0 0 250 500 
Gabon 115 242 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gambia 50 500 100 1,300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ghana 0 950 200 600 285 0 0 0 3,300 1,300 0 0 400 500 
Guinea 440 750 150 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guinea-Bissau 405 250 100 1,700 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kenya 379 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,500 
Lesotho 0 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liberia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Africa Appropriated FMF Continued 
                              
Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Madagascar 449 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malawi 1,391 100 0 0 0 0 0 569 900 0 0 0 0 0 
Mali 0 0 100 747 0 0 0 0 1,600 600 0 0 0 0 
Mauritania 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mauritius 0 650 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mozambique 0 0 0 0 400 0 200 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Namibia 0 3,000 100 600 0 270 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Niger 1,893 2,576 600 600 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nigeria 0 34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10,000 0 6,000 6,000 
Reunion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Rwanda 135 219 0 525 0 300 400 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sao Tome & 
Principe 225 70 100 190 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Senegal 1,853 5,000 5,000 2,700 0 0 0 1,965 900 2,600 0 0 400 500 
Seychelles 65 340 40 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sierra Leone 313 2,675 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Somalia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Africa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 350 300 250 0 6,700 6,000 
Sudan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Swaziland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tanzania 50 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Togo 190 158 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uganda 40 0 30 425 0 0 2,000 3,965 3,900 0 0 0 0 0 
Zambia 0 0 150 300 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Zimbabwe 0 1,100 250 890 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 





Table A2: Americas Appropriated FMF 1990-2002(In Thousands $) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Anguilla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Antigua & Barbuda 780 630 870 80 37 40 50 225 310 410 515 0 0 0 
Argentina 0 3,500 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 1,250 1,850 450 1,000 1,000 2,000 
Aruba 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bahamas 0 0 0 0 0 40 75 75 140 130 50 140 100 100 
Barbados 620 1,220 850 80 37 95 200 100 75 75 55 0 0 0 
Belize 0 500 500 500 160 0 75 75 100 100 100 200 200 300 
Bermuda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bolivia 38,228 35,000 25,000 18,595 2,967 3,229 0 0 0 0 250 0 500 2,000 
Bolivia  1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
British Virgin 
Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Canada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Chile 0 3,000 3,000 0 0 0 0 0 300 400 0 0 500 1,000 
Colombia 69,734 47,000 47,000 27,000 7,700 10,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 98,000 
Colombia  1,996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Dominica 700 530 470 110 37 40 50 100 115 145 150 0 0 0 
Dominican 
Republic 1,276 1,000 1,000 500 300 0 0 100 225 370 400 650 350 320 
Ecuador 0 2,000 2,339 1,150 130 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 
Ecuador  485 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
El Salvador 79,635 65,945 21,250 11,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 2,500 
French Guiana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Americas Appropriated FMF Continued 
                              
Grenada 600 530 477 200 37 40 350 100 145 190 165 0 0 0 
Guadeloupe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guatemala 2,887 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guyana 0 0 0 0 180 0 75 0 100 100 100 125 200 400 
Haiti 498 1,500 0 0 0 3,000 0 225 650 300 300 450 300 400 
Honduras 20,163 31,900 5,000 317 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Jamaica 1,000 1,000 2,500 399 300 299 600 415 450 475 500 585 600 700 
Martinique 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Montserrat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 
Antilles 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 500 
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 590 0 0 0 1,000 
Paraguay 0 0 250 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 
Peru 1,000 5,879 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
St. Kitts & 
Nevis 500 530 470 190 37 40 50 100 130 155 125 0 0 0 
St. Lucia 500 530 470 610 168 40 50 100 160 195 165 0 0 0 
Vincent & 
Grenadines 500 530 470 80 37 40 50 100 110 130 125 0 0 0 
Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 0 0 0 0 150 250 
Trinidad & 
Tobago 650 500 500 550 100 95 300 285 290 225 250 300 300 400 
Turks and 
Caicos 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 800 300 0 1,000 1,000 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Total 222,752 203,224 113,416 61,361 12,227 16,998 2,000 2,000 5,350 6,640 4,000 3,450 6,700 112,870 
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Table A3: East Asia and Pacific Appropriated FMF 1990-2002(In Thousands $) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brunei 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cambodia 0 0 0 0 750 1,300 2,000 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
China 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
East Timor 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 2,000 
Fiji 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 350 0 0 0 
French 
Polynesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 0 25,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kiribati 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Laos 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Marshall Is. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Micronesia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mongolia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 350 2,000 2,000 1,000 
Nauru 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New 
Caledonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Niue 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Palau 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Papua New 
Guinea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 140,395 185,543 25,000 15,000 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 1,437 2,000 19,000 20,000 
Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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East Asia and Pacific Appropriated FMF Continued 
                              
Solomon 
Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Taiwan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 3,017 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,300 2,000 
Tonga 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tuvalu 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Vietnam 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wallis & 
Futuna 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Western 
Samoa 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Table A4: International Appropriated FMF 1990-2002(In Thousands $) 
 
  1,990 1,991 1,992 1,993 1,994 1,995 1,996 1,997 1,998 1,999 2,000 2,001 2,002 2,003 
Antarctica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Classified 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Int'l Org. & 
Various 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
United Nations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Various 
Countries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,000 6,130 
 Total 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6,000 6,130 




Table A5: Europe Appropriated FMF 1990-2002(In Thousands $) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Albania 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,525 100 1,700 4,000 1,600 4,500 4,000 5,000 
Andorra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,000 3,000 
Austria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,000 3,000 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Belgium 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bosnia-Herzeg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,000 0 3,000 2,250 2,500 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,275 3,000 4,200 9,400 5,000 8,500 8,500 9,500 
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4,000 0 5,000 6,000 
Cyprus 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0 8,900 9,087 16,250 7,100 6,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 
Czechoslovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Denmark 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0 0 706 1,500 1,500 8,300 4,700 4,000 6,350 6,250 6,750 
Faroe Islands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
France 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Georgia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 700 5,350 7,950 3,000 4,500 11,000 7,000 
Germany 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gibraltar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Greece 348,495 350,000 350,000 315,000 283,500 229,635 224,000 122,500 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 0 0 0 250 0 0 3,200 10,087 16,600 7,100 6,000 9,000 10,000 11,000 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Ireland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,500 2,250 1,800 1,500 1,900 2,750 3,000 
Kyrgyzstan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 1,350 1,550 1,000 1,600 2,000 4,000 
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Europe Appropriated FMF Continued 
                              
Latvia 0 0 0 0 0 706 1,500 1,500 6,950 4,700 4,000 5,350 6,250 7,000 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 0 0 706 1,500 1,500 6,950 4,700 4,000 6,500 6,593 7,500 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 750 1,648 19,257 6,000 0 7,900 10,500 11,000 
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 300 450 0 0 1,000 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 3,450 1,250 1,250 1,500 1,250 1,500 
Monaco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 16,475 12,587 124,700 66,000 8,000 12,300 12,000 13,000 
Portugal 84,635 100,000 100,000 90,000 81,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,275 6,500 13,900 6,500 6,200 11,000 9,000 10,000 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2,250 2,250 0 0 1,000 0 0 
San Marino 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,550 6,000 3,200 3,200 2,800 8,400 7,750 9,000 
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 400 1,000 2,500 2,600 2,000 3,500 4,000 5,000 
Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Svalbard & 
Janmayen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 700 0 
Turkey 497,850 600,000 500,000 450,000 405,000 328,050 320,000 175,000 0 0 0 0 20,000 17,500 
Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 500 450 600 600 700 0 700 
Ukraine 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5,250 3,800 5,000 3,250 4,000 4,000 4,000 
U K 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 1,550 1,650 1,750 1,700 25,207 8,750 
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000 
 Total 930,980 1,050,000 950,000 855,250 769,500 560,803 597,850 364,809 244,957 150,100 66,400 112,200 177,000 168,700 
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Table A6: Middle East and Asia Appropriated FMF 1990-2002(In Thousands $) 
 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Afghanistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Algeria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bahrain 0 0 1,000 500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,250 800 0 0 0 0 
Bhutan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Egypt 1,294,410 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 1,300,000 
Gulf CC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
India 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 50,000 
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Iraqi Nat. 
Congress 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Israel 1,792,260 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 1,800,000 2,820,000 1,980,000 2,040,000 2,100,000 
Jordan 67,794 20,000 20,000 9,000 9,000 7,300 100,300 30,045 50,000 95,900 124,915 75,000 75,000 198,000 
Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lebanon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maldives 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Morocco 42,815 39,600 22,000 40,000 0 0 0 0 0 4,000 1,500 2,500 3,500 5,000 
Myanmar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 800 500 0 0 2,000 3,000 
Oman 0 3,000 500 1,000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20,000 







Middle East and Asia Appropriated FMF Continued 
 
                              
Pakistan 184,369 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Saudi 
Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sri Lanka 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Tunisia 29,871 10,000 10,000 2,000 0 0 0 0 0 2,000 3,000 2,500 3,500 5,000 
UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Yemen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 




Table A7: Total FMF 1990-2002(In Thousands $) 
 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Grand 
Total 4,727,850 4,665,792 4,249,121 4,097,048 3,892,862 3,687,731 3,814,893 3,507,103 3,416,507 3,369,640 4,332,202 3,479,650 3,652,000 4,010,200 
 
 
Note: Supplemental Appropriation was excluded due to 
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